This research analyzes how individuals make forecasts based on time series data, and tests an intervention designed to improve forecasting performance. Using data from a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that forecasting behavior systematically deviates from normative predictions: Forecasters over-react to errors in relatively stable environments, but under-react to errors in relatively unstable environments. Surprisingly, the performance loss due to systematic judgment biases is larger in stable than in unstable environments. In a second study, we test an intervention designed to mitigate these biased reaction patterns. In order to reduce the salience of recent demand signals, and emphasize the environment generating theses signals, we require forecasters to prepare a forecast in other time-series before returning to their original time-series. This intervention improves forecasting performance.
Introduction
Demand forecasting in time series environments is fundamental to many operational decisions. Poor forecasts can result in inadequate capacity, excess inventory or inferior customer service. Given the importance of good forecasts to operational success, quantitative methods of time-series forecasting are well known and widely available (cf. Makridakis, Wheelwright and Hyndman 1998) . Despite the fact that companies frequently have access to time-series history and sophisticated quantitative methods embedded in forecasting software, empirical evidence shows that real world forecasting frequently relies on human judgment. In a study of 240 U.S. corporations, while over 90% of companies reported having access to some forecasting software (Sanders and Manrodt 2003a) , only 29% of firms primarily use quantitative forecasting methods, 30% primarily use judgmental methods while the remaining 41% apply both quantitative and judgmental methods (Sanders and Manrodt 2003b) . Although quantitative analysis based on a time-series may often provide the basis for a forecast, it is a common practice to alter such forecasts based on human judgment (Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence and Nikolopoulos 2009) .
A recent trend in operations management research is to study operational decisions from a behavioral perspective (Bendoly, Donohue and Schultz 2006) . While much research in behavioral operations management is devoted to inventory decision making, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000, p. 419) highlight the importance of explicitly separating the forecasting task from the inventory decision task: "While the forecasting task typically requires managerial judgment, the task of converting a forecast into an order quantity can be automated. A firm may reduce decision bias by asking managers to generate forecasts that are then automatically converted into order quantities." Thus, inventory decisions can (and frequently should) be decomposed: When choosing an order quantity, an individual has to estimate the probability distribution of future demand; derive a service level; and then use demand distribution and service level to determine an order quantity. Biased judgments of demand distributions would result in sub-optimal inventory decisions. For example, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) investigate newsvendor decision making under stationary and known demand distributions, a setting where demand forecasting is theoretically irrelevant. A key finding is that order quantities are on average biased towards mean demand, relative to the expected profit maximizing order quantity. This biased ordering has been attributed to unsystematic randomness in decision making (Su 2008 ) as well as the more systematic biases like demand chasing (Kremer et al. 2010) , i.e., the tendency to adjust orders toward previous demand. In a more complex "beergame" setting, Croson and Donohue (2003) observe the bullwhip effect, i.e. upstream order amplification in the supply chain, with participants who face a known and stationary demand distribution. Croson, Donohue, Katok and Sterman (2009) observe this effect even with constant and deterministic demand. In sum, existing experimental evidence suggests that biased judgments of demand distributions can strongly affect the quality of higher-order decisions like purchasing, inventory or capacity planning. Therefore, the analysis of judgmental forecasting is crucial for a better understanding of decision making in operations management.
Extensive literature on human judgment in time-series forecasting exists (Lawrence, Goodwin, O"Connor and Onkal 2006) . Central findings include the wide-spread use of heuristics such as anchorand-adjustment, as well as the importance of feedback and task decomposition on forecasting performance. However, the overall findings remain somewhat inconclusive, in part because forecasting behavior appears sensitive to different components of the time-series. Further, the judgmental forecasting literature is typically concerned with the detection of predictable changes in a time series, such as trends or seasonality (Harvey 2007) . In contrast, our research is focused on individual reaction to unpredictable change in time-series. We ask the following two research questions: First, how do individuals create timeseries forecasts in unstable environments? Second, what can managers do to improve forecasting performance?
We study these questions in a laboratory setting that allows for precise normative predictions:
forecasting a time series generated by a perturbed random walk. Across a wide range of environmental conditions, we show that time-series forecasting behavior is described by an error-response model. However, forecasters tend to over-react to forecast errors in more stable environments and under-react to forecast errors in less stable environments. This pattern is consistent with the system neglect hypothesis (Massey and Wu 2005) which posits that forecasters place too much weight on recently observed forecast errors relative to the environment that produces these signals. To explore how to improve forecasting performance, we therefore design and test an intervention which builds directly on the system neglect hypothesis. Instead of making forecasts for a single time-series (our base study), we require subjects to make forecasts for multiple time-series in parallel in our second study, in an attempt to reduce the relative salience of a recent signals and re-emphasize the demand environment underlying/common to all timeseries. We find that this simple intervention can improve forecasting performance.
We proceed in this paper as follows. The next section outlines the academic literature that relates to our research. In §3 we discuss our theoretical developments. In §4 we discuss the results of our first study, which is focused on understanding human judgment in time-series analysis tasks. Section 5 is devoted to the results of our second study, which emphasizes managerial interventions to improve human judgment in time-series analysis tasks. We discuss our results and conclude the paper in §6.
Related Literature
Existing research on judgmental forecasting provides vast but somewhat inconclusive empirical evidence regarding forecasting performance, cognitive processes, and managerial interventions. Many studies have been devoted to comparing the performance of human forecasts to quantitative forecasting methods, but the empirical evidence is not consistent (Lawrence et al. 1985 , Carbone and Gorr 1985 , Sanders 1992 , Fildes et al. 2009 ). The literature has also investigated a variety of cognitive processes underlying the evolution of judgmental forecasts, such as different variations of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Harvey 2007) . Regarding managerial interventions, judgmental forecast accuracy can improve with performance feedback (e.g., Stone and Opel 2000) and task properties feedback (e.g., Sanders 1997), but the effectiveness of these levers depends on specific contextual elements of the forecasting task (Lawrence et al. 2006) . Existing research on judgmental time-series forecasting examines pattern detection, i.e. how well human subjects can identify trends and seasonal changes in a noisy time series (Andreassen and Kraus 1990; Lawrence and O'Connor 1992; Bolger and Harvey 1993; Lawrence and O"Connor 1995) . In contrast, our research focuses on change detection, i.e. how subjects separate random noise from unsystematic level changes.
When observing signal variation in a time-series, a forecaster needs to identify if there is substantive (and persistent) cause for this variation, or whether variation just represents noise with no implications for future observations. The ability to distinguish substantive change from random variation has been studied extensively in the literature on regime change detection (Barry and Pitz 1979) . A central conclusion from regime change research is that people under-react to change in environments that are unstable and have precise signals, and overreact in environments that are stable with noisy signals (Griffin and Tversky 1992) . This seemingly contradictory reaction pattern has been reconciled by the system-neglect hypothesis (Massey and Wu 2005) , which posits that individuals overweigh signals relative to the underlying system which generates the signals.
A related stream of research in financial economics seeks to explain the pattern of short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction to information, often observed in stock market investment decisions (Poteshman 2001) . Some theoretical work has been devoted to explaining this behavioral pattern, e.g. by linking such behavior to the "gambler"s fallacy" or the "hot-hand effect" (Barberis et al. 1998 , Rabin 2002 , Rabin and Vayanos 2009 . In an asset pricing context, Brav and Heaton (2002) illustrate how an over-/underreaction pattern arises from biased information processing of investors subject to the representativeness heuristic (Kahnemann and Tversky 1972) and conservatism (Edwards 1968) , and show how this pattern can also arise from a fully Bayesian investor lacking structural knowledge about the possible instability of the time-series. Experimental tests of this "mixed-reaction pattern" include Bloomfield and Hales (2002) and Asparouhova, Hertzel and Lemmon (2009) 
A central difference between our research and existing research on human change detection patterns is the complexity of the judgment environment. In Massey and Wu (2005) , participants face binary signals (red or blue balls) which can be generated from two regimes (draws from two urns with fixed proportions of red and blue balls in each). Given a sequence of signals, the experimental task is to identify when a regime change (i.e. a switch from one urn to the other) has occurred. Further, as subjects have a perfect knowledge of the system parameters (the proportion of blue balls in either urn) there is no ambiguity concerning the relevant world. This environment fits a binary forecasting task where a well-known phenomenon needs to be detected (for example, when a bull market turns into a bear market). Similarly, in Bloomfield and Hales (2002) and Asparouhova et al. (2009) , participants face a fairly simple series of signals generated from a symmetric random walk. Brav and Heaton (2002) illustrate their theoretical considerations in an environment where a series of independently and identically distributed assets exhibit a single structural break which shifts the asset distribution only once during the time series. A central question of our research is whether the over-reaction/under-reaction patterns observed in such fairly simple settings translate to the relatively richer environment of time-series demand forecasting under frequent change. Further, beyond trying to understand human reaction patterns, our study designs and tests an intervention to mitigate biases and the resulting performance losses.
Theory
To begin our theory development, it is important to briefly characterize the judgment task underlying a time-series forecast. In essence, a forecaster (=she) needs to decide whether observed variation in the time series data provides a reason to modify a previous forecast in the next period. We illustrate this judgment task in Figure 1 . Variation indicates … Variation in the underlying level of the time series, the most recent demand observations contain more information about the future than past observations, and need to receive more weight in the forecast. Her forecast is then close to the square in Figure 1 . Finally, if she believes that this variation is indicative of a trend, (an ongoing change in the level), she would extrapolate the existing variation to re-occur in the future, and her forecast would be close to the triangle in Figure 1 .
In practice, these choices are not mutually exclusive. A forecaster may decide that variation is partially due to noise, and partially due to a level change, and therefore create a forecast somewhere in between the square and the circle in Figure 1 . Or she may believe that variation represents both a level change and a trend. The key challenge is differentiating level changes from noise. While our empirical analysis will control for individuals potentially detecting illusory trends, our simulated demand environment does not contain trends, and a comprehensive discussion of trend detection is beyond the scope of this paper.
Demand Environment
We assume that forecasters react to demand observations in time intervals indexed by t, without any additional information on future demand realizations beyond that which is contained within the time series. The level of our time series changes according to a random walk. If we define μ t to be the level at time t, the level at the next regular observation at time t + 1 is given by μ t+1 = μ t + V t , where V t is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation c. The demand observation D t in each time period is then a normally distributed random variable with mean μ t and standard deviation n.
Roughly put, the standard deviation c captures the notion of change, i.e. permanent shocks to the timeseries, while the standard deviation n captures the noise surrounding the level, i.e. temporary shocks to the time-series. With a change parameter c, the level of the time series in the next period has a 68% chance of being within +/-c of the level in the current period. The noise parameter n implies a 68% chance of the actual demand observation being less than +/-n away from the true level. Figure 2 illustrates how the shape of a representative time series depends on these two parameters.
While allowing for randomly changing levels μ t , a time series from this data-generating process has no underlying systematic trend or seasonality. Although real time-series often contain such elements, methods to de-trend and de-seasonalize data are available (Winters 1960) . For simplicity, our research is focused on real-world data that has gone through such modifications, or data that can be well described by
Brownian motion, such as energy demand or airline passengers (Marathe and Ryan 2005) . Importantly, this simplification allows us to study the decision task of differentiating level changes from noise, without further confounding such judgments with the estimation of trends and seasonal elements. Further, the demand process we consider provides a simple normative benchmark: Single exponential smoothing (Harrison 1967, McNamara and Houston 1987) . 
Normative Benchmark
Structurally, the single exponential smoothing forecast F t+1 (made in period t for period t + 1), is a weighted average of the most recent demand observation and the previous forecast, +1 = + 1 − = + ( − ). The latter part of this equation highlights how the forecast +1 is driven by a response to the forecast error. The appropriate smoothing level * is a function of the change (c) and noise (n) parameters governing the time series. To further characterize * , it is useful to introduce the concept of weight of evidence. We formally define this weight as the change-to-noise ratio W = c 2 /n 2 , which increases as the degree of change in the time-series (c) rises, and decreases as the noise in the time demand are mostly level changes), forecast errors should strongly influence forecasts. This intuition is formally supported by Harrison (1967) and McNamara and Houston (1987) 
Note that the optimal smoothing constant in Eq. (1) depends only on the change-to-noise ratio W, while the demand time series is driven by absolute levels of c and n. For example in Figure 2 , condition 3 (c = 10 and n = 10) and condition 6 (c = 40 and n = 40) have the same W, and therefore the same associated * (W). The optimal forecasting mechanism for our demand environment is
Behavioral Forecasting and System Neglect
The previous section outlines how single exponential smoothing with α*(W) is optimal for a random walk described by c and n. In this section we discuss forecasting behavior relative to this normative benchmark.
From a behavioral perspective, Eq. (2) poses two critical assumptions on the forecaster"s degree of rationality (Brav and Heaton 2002) . The optimal forecasting mechanism implies that the forecaster has correct beliefs about the structure of the demand process, knowledge and understanding of the structure of the optimal forecasting mechanism, and access to an unbiased estimate of α*(W). It is optimistic to assume that given the complexity of the context, the forecaster has "structural certainty" about the demand environment (perturbed random walk) and optimal forecasting mechanism (single-exponential smoothing). For example, a forecaster may perceive trends where there are none (see Figure 1 ). Our empirical estimation in Section 4 will therefore allow for richer models that describe forecasting behavior beyond simple exponential smoothing. From a behavioral perspective, the crucial question is the choice of the smoothing constant ( ), relative to the unbiased estimate * ( ) in Eq. (2).
There are compelling reasons to assume that forecasters follow the error-response logic of simple exponential smoothing. Practically, exponential smoothing corresponds to the mental process of error detection and subsequent adaptation. 2 Given a constant smoothing parameter α, it represents single-loop learning where a forecaster observes an error and then adjusts her next forecast based on that error. As such, exponential smoothing, interpreted as trial-and-error learning, is a plausible model for real behavior.
Further, exponential smoothing has two important characteristics as a boundedly rational decision heuristic: It does not require much memory because the most recent forecast contains all information necessary to make the next forecast, and it is a robust heuristic in many different environments, beyond the particular one used in our study (Gardner 1985 and 2006) .
How humans evaluate and subsequently respond to signals has been tied to the concepts of representativeness and conservatism. Representativeness means that individuals have a tendency to overreact to a signal and account only insufficiently for the weight they should attribute to that signal. For example, individuals neglect to acknowledge that a small sample size implies that only a low statistical weight should be attributed to the sample (Tversky and Kahnemann 1971) . In our context, representativeness implies that forecasters consistently use a higher W than the underlying time series would entail when determining their α(W). On the other hand, conservatism implies that individuals have a tendency to underreact to a signal, even though the statistical weight they should attribute to the signal is strong. This phenomenon has mostly been observed in the context of Bayesian updating (Camerer 1995) . In our context, conservatism implies that human forecasters consistently use a lower W than the underlying time series would entail. Massey and Wu (2005) integrate these observations into a systemneglect hypothesis: the strength of the signal is salient in the decision maker"s perception, whereas the system that generated the signal is latent in the background. This leads to a general neglect of the system, such that the decision maker emphasizes the strength of a signal at the expense of the weight that should be attached to that signal. In other words, the weight of the signal is less of a determinant of behavior than it ought to be. For the forecasting context of our study, system-neglect leads us to believe that W is less a determinant of behavior than Eq. (1) implies. Specifically, we would expect that our behavioral α(W) is less responsive to W (i.e. the curve is flatter) than α*(W).
As Massey and Wu point out, the system neglect hypothesis predicts that there is relatively more overreaction for low values of W, and relatively more under-reaction for high values of W. In our context, for 
Study 1 (Baseline)

Experimental Design
In a controlled laboratory environment, subjects make sequential forecasts based on an evolving time series of demand realizations generated from a perturbed random walk. Subjects were told they were managing inventory at a retail store. For 50 periods, subjects observed demand and were asked to make a point forecast for the next time period. Throughout the experiment, a visible graph was updated to include all demand realizations up to the current period. A table also provided historic demand information, as well as information on previous forecasts, absolute forecast errors, and relative forecast errors.
Our theoretical developments in the previous section posit that human forecasters react to forecast errors, and that their reaction pattern depends systematically on the forecasting environment. To test our main research hypothesis (system neglect), we vary experimental conditions along the two parameters of our forecasting environment, c and n. First, we vary the degree of change, by letting c equal 0, 10, or 40.
Second, we vary the degree of noise, by letting n equal 10 or 40. This results in six experimental conditions representing different demand environments, ranging from no-change-low-noise (c = 0, n = 10) to high-change-high-noise (c = 40, n = 40), as shown in Table 1 . Environments characterized by a significant degree of change over time are likely to produce rather distinct demand evolutions. To ensure overall consistency between demand data and the data-generating system, we generated four demand datasets from each of the six environments. Data in each time series
represented units of demand in each period. We implement the resulting 6*4 = 24 treatments in a between-subject design. Subjects are not informed that data was generated by a random walk with noise, and they are also not provided with the actual parameters c and n in their condition (see Asparouhova et al. 2009 for a similar design). Instead, subjects receive 30 historic data points by condition before making their first forecast, shown throughout the experiment in both the graph and the history table. The example time-series datasets depicted in Figure 2 are actual datasets from our experiment.
The forecasting task was implemented in the experimental software zTree (Fischbacher 2007) . In order to provide incentives for accurate forecasting, we paid each subject $10 multiplied by the subject"s accuracy across the = 5050 periods. (Forecasting accuracy was defined as (1 − ), where
, the Mean Absolute Percentage Error calculated based on the entire history of forecasts and demand observations .) In addition, each subject was paid a participation fee of $5.
Payoffs were rounded up to the next full dollar value, and the average payoff was $14.80.
Data
The baseline study (Study 1) was conducted at a behavioral lab in a large, public university in the American Midwest. The 252 participants in the study belonged to a subject pool associated with the business school, and registered for the study in response to an online posting. About 50% of the subjects were current undergraduate students from various fields. The remaining 50% consisted of either graduate students or staff at the university. 23 of the 24 treatment conditions had at least 10 subjects, while one treatment had 8 subjects.
To correct for errors and outliers, we examined all individual forecasts with an absolute forecast error − > 300. In a few cases, obvious typographical errors could be determined and the forecasts were corrected accordingly. If the intended forecast could not be determined, but the response appeared to be a typographic error (i.e. one forecast of 20 in between a long series of forecasts between 700 and 900), that forecasts was recorded as missing. In total, such corrections were rare (<0.1 % of all forecasts). Prior to completing Study 1, we also completed a pretest (261 subjects) at a different university located in the American Northeast; more details about the pretest are given in appendix 1.
Initial Analyses
Let denote forecast for period t made by subject i in period t-1, after observing demand −1 , and let = denote the corresponding average across all individuals within a given condition. The optimal forecast for period t is given −1 * ( ) which we abbreviate by * for notational convenience. Through its dependence on the smoothing constant * ( ) and the demand realizations −1 , it is understood that * is specific to each of the six conditions (which differ by W) as well as to each of the four demand sets within a condition (which differ by the vector of demand realizations ). Table 2 compares the observed mean absolute forecast error
which is the T-period average across all I subjects in all S demand seeds within a given demand environment, over all conditions. Simple t-tests (p ≤ .01) confirm the observed mean absolute error is significantly larger than the corresponding error measure based on optimal forecasts, , * .
Further, a comparison across environments is consistent with our intuition: performance deteriorates when noise n and instability c increase. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of demand , observed forecasts , and normative forecasts * .
Without formal analysis, we can make a number of observations. The observed forecasts (grey line) mimic the evolution of demand (dots). This is consistent with exponential smoothing, but certainly not optimal in the stable demand environments (conditions 1 and 2), where the correct forecasts We next compare observed forecast adjustments to the normative exponential smoothing benchmark.
To formalize adjustments as a response to observed forecast error, we define the adjustment score
, which follows immediately from rearranging the single exponential smoothing formula in Eq. (2). 3 We can use this ratio to categorize observed behavior, as shown in Figure 5 . A score of < 0 would indicate that subjects adjusted their forecast in the opposite direction of their forecast error (11% of all observations). Possible explanations of such behavior would be that subjects either followed a previously salient trend expectation, or believed in the law of small numbers, i.e. that high values of a 3 By construction, this score is not defined for the first period, nor for when −1 = −1 . Note that this ratio has been used before as an adjustment score in newsvendor research (cf. Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) . , it is consistent with adjusting the current forecast to the observed forecast error. Finally, any adjustment score > 1 (37% of all observations) indicates that subjects were extrapolating illusionary trends into the future. This initial analysis highlights that while simple error-response level adjustment is the dominant response pattern, there is strong evidence that subjects tend to adjust their forecasts beyond the range consistent with simple exponential smoothing. This calls for a more comprehensive description of behavior, which we provide in the next section. To provide a brief, aggregate analysis 4 of forecast adjustments across conditions, we calculate = 1 ( ) while noting that such average scores need to be interpreted with caution. Several directional observations can be made (see Table 3 ). First, the reaction α increases in the degree of change, and decreases in the degree of noise. This observation is in line with our normative predictions from Eq.
(1), as subject behavior corresponds directionally to change in the change-to-noise ratio as one would expect. Second, in all conditions, the average reaction differs from the normative reaction. Condition 5
shows some evidence for underreaction, whereas all other conditions show some evidence of overreaction.
4 Because excessively high and low adjustments can have a strong influence on this analysis, we remove all < −1 (5% of observations) and all > 2 (8% of observations). 0 ≤ α it ≤ 1, i.e. exponential smoothing. 
A Generalized Model of Forecasting Behavior
The previous section has highlighted that actual behavior is not completely captured by single exponential smoothing, and identifying a descriptively accurate forecasting model is ultimately an empirical question.
Rather than imposing single exponential smoothing as the only model, we allow our data to select a preferred model of forecasting behavior. We include two generalizations in the empirical specification of behavior: initial anchoring and illusionary trends. Initial anchoring refers to the well documented tendency of individuals to anchor their decisions on some artificial or self generated value (Epley and Gilovich 2001) . Illusionary trends refer to the idea that people are fast to see trends where there are none (DeBondt 1993).
We conceptualize forecasts as containing three essential structural components: A level estimate L t , a trend estimate T t , and "trembling hands" noise ε t , leading to a generalized structural equation for forecast
We include the noise term because human decision making is known to be inherently stochastic (Rustichini 2008) . We specify the level term in (3) as
The specification in Eq. (4) introduces the anchoring parameter θ L and the constant C. While exponential smoothing suggests that forecasters correctly and exclusively anchor on their previous forecasts, the literature on anchor and adjustment heuristics often includes the initial values of a time series as an additional anchor (Chapman and Johnson 2002) . The parameter θ L allows people to either anchor their forecasts only on previous forecasts (θ L = 1), or to anchor their forecasts on the initial and constant value C (θ L = 0) or some combination of these two extremes (0 < θ L < 1). Note that in stable time series, initial anchoring with θ L = 1 is normatively correct, since forecasts should be constant.
Forecasters should never develop trend estimates in the context of our time series, but this is a normative aspect unknown to our subjects. Our data-generating process can produce random successive level increases or decreases that can easily be perceived as trends (see Figure 2) . Because there is considerable evidence that forecasters are quick to see trends where they do not exist (DeBondt 1993), we specify the trend term in (3) as
which corresponds to double exponential smoothing. Using Eq. (4), we can re-write Eq. (5) as
Combining Eqs. (3), (4) and (6), rearranging terms, allowing Δ to symbolize first differences and E t to represent the forecast error (D t -F t ), we can specify our generalized forecasting model as follows:
Eq. (7) serves as the basis of our empirical estimation (see Appendix 2 for additional remarks on model and error specification). This model nests the normative benchmark for our context (i.e., single exponential smoothing) as a special case for = 1 and = 0.
To test whether the generalizations made in Eq. (7) are necessary, we conduct a hierarchical analysis to examine whether it is empirically justified to simplify Eq. (7) to the normative benchmark of single exponential smoothing or not. To that purpose, we estimate four different models: A full model (Model 4), a model without ΔF t as independent variable (Model 3), a model without ΔF t and ΔD t as independent variables (Model 2), and a model without ΔF t and ΔD t as independent variables, without a constant, and with the constraint of = 1 (Model 1). For each of the six experimental conditions, we estimate the structural parameters of these 4 models, including random slopes and intercepts (see Eq. (10) in appendix 2), using maximum likelihood (ML). 5 From the last row in each condition in Table A1 (labeled Δχ 2 ), we can see that the likelihood ratio tests for the decrease in model fit by going from one less constrained to a more constrained model indicate that any simplification of model 4 leads to a significant decrease in model fit across all conditions. This confirms our observation from the previous section. Based on the model fit statistics, simple exponential smoothing does not fully describe observed behavior, and the generalized model of Eq. (7) is empirically the preferred model. One can also see that α, our main parameter of interest (the effect of µ(E t ), shown in the first row under each condition for all models)
generally increases the more we constrain the model. In other words, the estimate for α in simpler models tends to suffer from a positive bias, i.e. be higher than it"s true value, since these simpler models do not account for additional forms of subject reaction (besides error-response) inherent in our data.
Consequently, the simple average adjustment scores reported in Table 3 inflate the true reaction α, since they do not control for additional behavioral effects. We therefore focus our analysis on interpreting the behavioral parameters estimated in model 4.
Results
We use the estimates for model 4 in each condition (see Table A1 in the appendix) to calculate the behavioral parameters (i.e. α, β, θ L and C) of Eq. (7) (See Appendix 2 for details). We provide an overview of these behavioral parameters in Table 4 . Note that all parameter tests reported in this section are Wald tests on specific parameters, or linear/nonlinear combination of parameters. We use likelihood ratio tests only to test null-hypotheses on random effects or to compare nested models (Verbeek 2000) .
Clear patterns emerge from our analysis. In all conditions, the reaction parameter α is positive and significant (p ≤ .01), indicating that individuals react to their most recent forecast error. We further test whether the behavioral αs are different from their normative values, as Hypothesis 1 would predict. Note that α > α* implies overreaction, and α < α* implies underreaction. We find evidence for overreaction in conditions 1,2 and 4, a "correct" reaction that is not significantly different from the normative value in conditions 3 and 6, and evidence for underreaction in condition 5. This pattern is consistent with systemneglect and confirms our main hypothesis. We now test whether our behavioral estimates for α from Table 4 react to changes in our experimental parameters as expected. To do so, we re-estimate model 4 across two conditions simultaneously, allowing model parameters to change between conditions. This contrast estimation allows us to test whether model parameters are significantly different from each other between conditions. The results from this analysis are reported in Table 5 . We observe that α increases significantly in c initially (c = 0 versus c = 10), with no further increase for c = 40. We further observe that α decreases significantly in n, except for the stationary demand conditions with c = 0.
The full model includes additional behavioral parameters besides α. While we view these additional parameters primarily as statistical controls for behavioral effects that may otherwise be falsely attributed to , we briefly comment on three additional results. First, consider the anchoring parameter θ L . Note that in conditions 1 and 2, initial anchoring is functionally equivalent to the normative benchmark, and we see evidence for such anchoring in the data. In the other conditions, initial anchoring is not the normative benchmark, and we see that in conditions 3 and 5,( i.e. low noise conditions), no initial anchoring takes place. We observe evidence for initial anchoring only in the high noise conditions (4 and 6), leading to the conclusion that this decision bias is visible in our data, but only if noise is high.
Next, consider the illusionary trend parameter β. In conditions 1,3,5 and 6, β is positive and significant, indicating that in these conditions, respondents do tend to see illusionary trends. Interestingly, there is little evidence for a significant β in conditions 2 and 4, indicating that the tendency to detect illusionary trends tends to be less prevalent in high noise conditions. Finally, consider the effects of ΔF t in Table A1 . These effects are generally negative and significant. Since θ L > α in all of our conditions, Eq.
(7) does not explain these negative effects. A possible post-hoc explanation for these negative effects may lie in regret: Strong recent changes in a forecast are countered by later forecast adjustments in the opposite direction. People may recognize their tendency to over-react (either due to system neglect of illusionary trends), and actively counter this prior over-reaction in a current forecast.
Performance Implications
We now explore how the decision biases uncovered in the previous section impact forecasting performance. Using the estimations from our generalized forecasting model, we can attribute loss in forecasting performance to two classes of (mis)behavior: systematic decision biases such as mis-specified error-response ( ≠ * ( )), initial anchoring (θ L ≠ 1) or illusionary trends ( > 0), and unsystematic "trembling hands" random errors. To separate these two sources of performance loss, we calculate for each demand seed s the forecast performance of three types of forecast evolutions: the normative, the observed, and the "behaviorally predicted" forecasts. The normative forecast in period t of seed s is defined by * = −1 , −1 * ( ) where * ( ) is common to all demand seeds within a demand environment. The observed forecast of subject i in period t of seed s is denoted . The predicted forecasts are defined as = −1 , −1 Θ sit , where Θ sit are the estimated parameters of our generalized forecasting model, including fixed effects and best linear unbiased predictions of random effects at the "dataset" level. The predicted forecasts are seed-and individual-specific forecasts that, unlike the observed , were "filtered" through the structural estimation of the parameters of our generalized forecasting model. These prediction were obtained using best linear unbiased predictions in Stata (see Bates and Pinheiro 1998) . We then measure performance for each of our six demand conditions as the mean absolute forecast error, averaged across all I subjects i and all S seeds s within that condition. Formally, for the observed forecasts, we define = 1 − , and equivalently for the normative ( ) and predicted forecasts ( ). 6 Using these definitions, we can describe the total performance loss from observed forecasts as ( − )/ . Importantly, we can precisely capture the loss in forecasting performance due to systematic decision biases ("Loss 1") as ( − )/ , and the loss in forecasting performance due to unsystematic random noise in decision making ("Loss 2") as ( − )/ . Table 6 provides an overview of our analysis. As expected, we observe that mean absolute errors from observed forecasts exceed those from normative forecasts. We also observe that MAEs increase in c and n, but this result has to be interpreted with caution. Different environments produce different forecast performance due to their inherent complexity. Forecasting performance relative to optimal performance improves in less stable environments (Loss Total). Interestingly, we observe that in general, the loss in performance due to random decision making (Loss 2) is as high as, or higher than, the loss of performance due to decision biases (Loss 1). Counter to intuition, Loss 1 is lower in conditions with high change (c = 40) than in conditions with little (c = 10) or no (c = 0) change. It seems that the decision heuristics individuals use to make forecasts work better in unstable and changing environments, and become more biased in stable environments.
One could make the argument that our performance comparison in Table 7 is unfair. Subjects did not know the c and n of their experimental condition, and would have had to use their existing data to estimate these parameters. Or, alternatively, forecasters may use an out-of-sample procedure, where they use the existing data to find optimal smoothing parameters directly (instead of estimating c and n).
Therefore we compared our normative MAEs to the MAEs obtained from an out-of-sample procedure: In each time period for each dataset, we estimated an optimal α 7 and created a forecast using that optimal α.
The MAE resulting from such out-of-sample forecasts was very close to the normative MAE reported in Table 7 .
Study 2 (Intervention)
The previous section documents how biased reaction patterns can lead to suboptimal forecasting accuracy. In this section we ask how one could improve performance. Consider that a key observation from our baseline study is a systematic pattern of over-and under-reaction to forecast errors. The main idea explaining this system neglect pattern is that the sensory nature of a signal may partially override the cognitive processes that determine how much weight should be attributed to the signal. This consistent tendency to "neglect the system" lends itself to the design of a possible intervention to improve forecasting performance. If one can re-emphasize the system that created a signal before a decision maker comes up with a forecast, one might reduce this 'cognitive override' of the signal, and lower the bias created by system-neglect. We therefore attempt to render signals less salient relative to the broader information about the environment that produced this signal by asking subjects to sequentially prepare forecasts for different demand time series. If subjects switch to a different time-series before making a new forecast, they need to re-focus on the new series. We hypothesize that this process breaks the saliency of observed forecast errors, and reduces system-neglect and the resulting over/under-reaction pattern across different demand environments.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (MULTIPLE TASK STRUCTURE): A task design that requires repeated sequential
forecasts for multiple time-series reduces system-neglect patterns and improves performance.
Experimental Design
In each period, subjects observe demand for a product, make a forecast for the next period, and repeat this task for all products in that period. As in our baseline study, we provide both a graph and a table that display the history of demand realizations as well as information on forecast errors.
We use demand environments 4 (c = 10, n = 40) and 6 (c = 40, n = 40) from our baseline study, and make the demand environment a between-subject factor. The two environments were specifically chosen because they represent conditions with very high and low Loss 1 in our baseline study (see Table 5 ), while only manipulating only c and leaving n constant. For 12 periods, subjects make one forecast for each of the four demand datasets nested within the same demand environment. We again pay subjects based on their mean absolute percentage forecasting error averaged across four products and 12 periods, in addition to a participation fee of $5. Subjects earned, on average, $14.94. Thirty-four subjects participated in demand environment 4, and forty subjects participated in environment 6. Subjects were from the same subject pool and had not participated in the baseline study.
Analysis
To test Hypothesis 2, we need to establish that subjects overreact less to their forecast error in condition 4
in the 4-Product treatment when compared to the baseline 1-Product treatment, while they react similarly in both treatments (i.e., close to the normative value) in condition 6. For this analysis, we re-estimate Eq.
(7) removing the random effects at the condition level while retaining random effects at the individual level. We also add a control variable for decision number, since forecasts in the baseline treatment will have been made earlier in the course of the experiment when compared to the 4-Product intervention.
Finally, we allow heteroskedasticity of regression errors between the 1-Product and 4-Product treatments.
A summary of the relevant parameter estimates and tests that examine whether these parameter estimates differ between the 1-Product and 4-Product treatments is given in Table 7 . As predicted, the parameter α in the 4-Product treatment is lower than in the 1-Product treatment within condition 4. Decision makers overreact to their error in both cases, but less so in the 4-Product treatment.
In condition 6, as expected, α estimates are not different from each other between the two treatments. This analysis supports Hypothesis 2.
Next we analyze the performance implications of the behavioral changes created by the intervention.
As a first test to compare the forecasting performance of subjects between the 4-Product to the 1-Product -3.73, p = .17 ). This finding is consistent with our expectations. Reducing system neglect through multi-product forecasting increases forecasting performance in condition 4 and has little or no effect in condition 6.
To test our predictions more precisely, we estimate a multi-level random effects model to predict the absolute forecast error in each observation. To make an equivalent comparison, we add an additional hierarchical level to our analysis, denoting x(s) to be the forecasting context x nested in dataset s. For example, the first forecast made in dataset 1 in condition 4 is a different context than the second forecast made in the same dataset. This random effect allows control for the randomness in absolute error. We also added a decision # variable to control for learning and fatigue effects, as the same instance is forecast at different times in the game in the 4-Product treatment and in the 1-Product treatment. The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 8 . 
Conclusion
Our research investigates judgmental time-series forecasting in environments that can be precisely described by their stability and noisiness. Behavior is to some degree consistent with the mechanics of single-exponential smoothing, the normative benchmark in our context. However, subjects tend to overreact to observed forecast errors for stable time series, and under-react to forecast error for less stable time series. This pattern is consistent with the system-neglect hypothesis found in the regime-change literature (cf. Massey and Wu 2005) ; our research provides empirical support for this hypothesis in a "many small changes" time-series forecasting context, which is notably different from the "few big changes" environments commonly investigated in the regime-change literature.
Surprisingly, our results show that decisions made in a stable environment suffer from stronger systematic decision biases, compared to decisions made in less stable environments. Human judgment appears to be more adapted to detecting change in volatile environments than to exploiting information in stable environments. A human tendency to react to noise may simply be the result of an evolved decision heuristic geared towards the detection of (and adaptation to) change. This would point to managerial judgment being better in unstable environments. Emphasis should be placed on automating decision making in stable environments.
We also show that the decline in forecasting performance due to randomness is at least as strong if not stronger than the decline in forecasting performance due to systematic biases. Since such randomness in decision making is mitigated by groups -i.e. multiple individuals preparing independent forecasts, and these forecasts being averaged (Larrick and Soll 2006) , this points to the large benefits than can be obtained by using an effective group decision making process in forecasting.
We test an experimental intervention which is designed to mitigate the existing systematic over-/under-reaction pattern. In particular, we required subjects to make sequential forecasts for multiple products in an effort to emphasize the environment (which is shared by all products) and de-emphasize the saliency of each the signal of each product. This intervention is effective in our laboratory setting.
From a theoretical perspective, this finding provides further evidence that the psychological process underlying the observed over-and under reaction patterns is indeed related to the low relative salience of the system generating an observed forecast error. It also suggest that it is possible to "overspecialize" in forecasting. While specialization in forecasting may increase tacit domain knowledge about the market and product, specialization may also increases the influence of system neglect in decision making.
Our results relate to the growing literature on behavioral operations management. Specifically, experimental studies of simple newsvendor settings have documented a persistent tendency to chase demand in stationary environments (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000 , Bolton and Katok 2008 , Kremer et al. 2010 ). Our study suggests that this tendency may be a forecasting phenomenon and not exclusively related to inventory ordering. While subjects in newsvendor studies have perfect knowledge about the underlying demand generating system, the system neglect hypothesis suggests that the signals and feedback they observe during the course of the experiment will make them at least partially neglect that knowledge. We therefore conjecture that decomposing forecasting and ordering in newsvendor experiments may be a fruitful and important endeavor. Further, newsvendor studies assume that using of a stationary and known demand environment makes the forecasting task simpler. Our results suggest that stable environments lead to more biased decision making. If subjects neglect their knowledge of the system and change forecasts based on signals, stable demand environments have not only little ecological validity (Brown and Steyvers 2008) , they may also be environments that significantly decrease the performance of human judgment. Finally, subjects in most newsvendor and beergame studies are confronted with demand stimuli in quick succession. Such a context provides a strong salience of demand signals. Our study would suggest that decision makers may perform better when the relative saliency of the most recent demand signal is mitigated, for example by re-emphasizing the environment before making the next decision. It would be interesting to test whether performance in newsvendor experiments can be improved by re-emphasizing the demand environment after each decision.
Our study has several limitations. Our intervention study was designed to emphasize the "demandgenerating system" by asking subjects to forecast multiple time-series, but the success of this intervention may stem merely from the time lag between successive forecasts of an individual time-series. Future research could explore if performance improvements can be achieved by occupying subjects for the same time with an unrelated task. Additionally, while our analyses explicitly controlled for initial anchoring and illusionary trends, our study was not designed to explore these behaviors in detail. (Fildes et al. 2009 ). Future research could more explicitly address the impact of such anchors.
Our research provides a solid theoretical and empirical framework for modeling human judgment in forecasting in non-stationary time-series. This rich context is relevant for many different fields beyond operations management. For example, our framework may be useful for the study of overreaction and illusionary trends in stock markets, or for examining how medical doctors interpret longitudinal data of their patients, or perhaps as a window for understanding human reactions to climate change. We envision these developments to be not only empirical but also theoretical in nature. Our research suggests a simple and fairly generic way of formally capturing a persistent judgment bias and its relationship to parameters describing a non-stationary environment. Our results could thus inform future work on how to design information and incentive systems that are robust to the kinds of judgment biases we observe. 
Finally, as we will see in the analysis, the following (equivalent) specification of Eqn. (8) provides for an easier comparison of nested models, and therefore serves as our primary empirical specification:
  
In general, an observation at time t in the experiment is nested in subject i, who is nested in demand dataset s, which in turn is nested in experimental condition (i.e., demand environment) c. Since we estimate our model within each condition, this implies a three level nested structure of error terms, such that we have random intercepts v s and w i . Further, we believe that the behavioral parameters of our model vary considerably, depending on both the actual dataset being observed and on the individual performing the forecast. This expectation would imply that a 1 -a 4 should be modeled as random coefficients.
However, results in our pretest show that, while there was some variance over a 1 and a 3 , there was little variance on the other two coefficients. Estimating random coefficients models in which the coefficients have little variance can lead to non-convergence and inappropriate standard errors. We therefore only Notes. ** p≤.01; * p≤.05; † p≤.10; µ(x) stands for the mean of random effect x; σ i (x) stands for the standard deviation of random effect x at the individual level (s indicates dataset level);
